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The Dilemma of a Civil Libertarian: Francis Biddle
And the Smith Act
THOMAS L. PAHL
Mankato State College

ABSTRACT - Although society may have good reasons for protecting itself against both sedition
and conspiracy, history demonstrates that statutes directed against these offenses are particularly
prone to result in the abuse of power. A possibility of just such an abuse in the first application
of the Smith Act - the Minneapolis Trotskyite trial of 1941 - led to a consideration of a civil
libertarian caught in the cross-pressure of enforcing a law anathema to his professed liberal beliefs. The study showed that, during time of threat, internal or external, our democratic society
permits our government officials, in the name of survival, to limit those freedoms guaranteed by
our Constitution.

During 1937 various individuals were expelled from
the Socialist Party because of their revolutionary, left
wing beliefs. These people held a convention in Chicago
during the New Year's weekend at which the Socialist
Worker Party was organized. This convention issued a
Declaration of Principles and adopted a constitution.
Thus a party organization was set up and party activities proceeded.
The Declaration set forth the program of action to
effectuate the overthrow of the existing capitalistic society and the government that supported it. The first step
was to build up strength of the party so that it could
have a majority of the exploited classes back of its leadership. The final step was to replace the existing government, by force if necessary.
The Party opposed Stalin and supported Trotsky and
his program. After Trotsky arrived in Mexico, various
leaders of the group conferred with him as to policies
and actions, especially concerning the use of Defense
Guards within labor unions. They were to be used for
protection of the unions, later growing into a militia, and
still later into a Red Army. Such a Defense Guard was
organized in the Teamsters Local 544 at Minneapolis in
July or August, 1938. It never realized the dreams of
Trotsky, however. Its activities were limited to parking
cars at the 544 annual picnic, target practice for those
interested, and close order drill foilowed by a visit to a
cheap strip show.
The Party also engaged in writing, publishing, and
disseminating publications designed to convert others to
their program. They also encouraged members of the
armed forces to think of their officers as tools of the existing capitalistic society and its imperialistic war-mongering government.
In December, 1940, the Party held a convention
where, because of the Smith Act, the Declaration of
Principles was suspended and withdrawn. This was obThe author holds the M.A. (1964) in political science from
the University of Minnesota, and was formerly instructor of
political science at Moorhead State College and The College
of St. Thomas. Other publications are "The Child Benefit
Theory," Proceedings, Minnesota Academy of Science, 1964 and
"G-String Conspiracy, Political Reprisal, or Armed Revolt,"
Labor History, 1966.
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viously an attempt to give evidence that the Party had
broken and abandoned the desire to use force to overthrow the government and the advocacy of insubordination in the armed forces.
In 1941 agents of the FBI got jobs as truck drivers
in Minneapolis and joined Local 544 to observe its leadership. In June U.S. marshals raided the headquarters
of the Party, confiscated two bushels of paper, two red
flags, and several pictures of Leon Trotsky. The arrest
and trial under the Smith Act followed.
The role of Francis Biddle in the Trotskyite trial is
quite enigmatic. Biddle was named to the Circuit Court
of Appeals by Franklin Roosevelt in 1939; and when
Robert Jackson became Attorney General in 1940,
Biddle was appointed Solicitor General. On 11 June
1941 Jackson resigned as Attorney General to accept a
Supreme Court position and Biddle became acting and
later Attorney General. It was as acting Attorney General that Biddle authorized the criminal action against
the Minneapolis Trotskyites.
In an earlier symposium on civil liberties (Biddle,
April 1941) the then Solicitor General spoke on "Government and Propaganda" and said that the question of
propaganda inevitably brings into question the "circumstances" of the time. Biddle's consideration of circumstances seems to be a reflection of the fears, insecurities,
and conflicts produced by the threat of war and the
threat of Bolshevik Revolution. These same fears, insecurities, and conflicts had brought about the passage
of the Smith Act earlier in the year.
Before the raids of the Party headquarters, Biddle had
remarked that sedition statutes invariably had been used
to prevent and punish criticism of the government, particularly in time of war. He believed them to be unnecessary and harmful and doubted whether any speech or
writing should be made criminal. However, this skepticism concerning sedition laws does not seem to square
with public statements attributed to Biddle immediately
following the raids. He is quoted as saying that the action
was being taken against "persons who have engaged in
criminal activities and have gained control of a legitimate
labor union to use it for illegitimate purpose." (New
Yark Times, 2 Dec. 1941 ) A local newspaper claimed
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that the Attorney General revealed the decision to make
these prosecutions the start of a nationwide drive on those
regarded as dangerous radicals and Communists. The
paper saw action by the Justice Department as "grim determination" to push the case to a swift conclusion. (St.
Paul Pioneer Press, 23 June 1941)
Biddle was attacked immediately by the American
Civil Liberties Union as well as by his liberal friends.
Three days after the raids, the ACLU telegraphed acting
Attorney General Biddle, urging reconsideration of the
move to prosecute the SWP members. The telegram declared that the government's action "is obviously dangerous to the preservation of democracy" (Minneapolis
Star Journal, 1 July 1941). A month later the ACLU
sent another protest to Biddle, calling upon the Department of Justice to dismiss the prosecution, claiming that
the government injected itself into an inter-union controversy in order to promote the interests of the side
which supported the Administration's foreign and domestic policy. Still later the ACLU challenged the constitutionality of the injunction because it felt that the case
had been wrongly removed from one involving expression of opinion and that the threat of force did not constitute an overt act as claimed by Biddle (Minneapolis
Star Journal, 20 October 1941).
Liberal I. F. Stone, in an article entitled "The GString Conspiracy," belittled the entire action and concluded by saying;
"Without allegations as to overt acts or some clear
and present danger," these prosecutions are prosecutions of opinion. Yet Mr. Biddle and Mr. Berge were
willing to take responsibility for them without the full
inquiry warranted by a step so out of accord with
our free traditions. If I understand Mr. Biddle rightly
he thinks that a government need not wait for an
overt act but can punish men for the probable consequences which would result if they tried to put their
ideas into action. This reasoning is no different from
that on which Trotskyites are jailed in the Third
Reich or the Soviet Union. On this basis, Thoreau
could have been kept in jail for life. (The Nation,
26 July 1941)
Two days later the New Republic continued the attack on the Attorney General,
"That the Minneapolis case is important goes without
saying. President Roosevelt and Acting Attorney General Biddle have repeatedly promised that there
would be no such violations of civil liberties as
stained the honor of America in the last war. For a
country preparing to fight for the principle of democracy now to violate those principles either in
hysterical fear of a little handful of theoretical Communists, or as a part of a sordid political maneuver
to help the AF of L and hurt the CIO would be unforgivable; it would be worth ten divisions to Hitler."
( "Civil Liberties in Minneapolis," 1941)
John Dos Passos, writing "To a Liberal in Office," in
a letter designed to reach the sensitive ear of Roosevelt
but applicable to Biddle as well said,
"What I want to ask you is this; what is more dangerous to that survival of the democratic process in this
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country for which I am sure you would gladly lay
down your life - the uprising of a few fanatics who
control a single local of a trade union or a situation
in which the government undermines at home those
four freedoms for which it is asking the nation to
make every sacrifice abroad'? ( The Nation, 6 September 1941)
Biddle, apparently sensitive to the criticism of his
liberal friends, attempted to clarify his position in the

New York Times,
"It seems to me that the most important job an Attorney General can do in a time of emergency is to
protect civil liberties.
In times such as these a strange psychology
grips us . . . we are likely to vent our dammed up
energy on a scapegoat . . . it may be a labor union
which stands up for what it believes to be its rights
. . . In so far as I can . . . I intend to see that
civil liberties in this country are protected; that we do
not again fall into the disgraceful hysteria of witch
hunts, strike-breakings and minority persecutions
which were such a dark chapter in our record of the
last World War." (New York Times, 21 September
1941)

This attempt to soften the liberal critics was too much
to swallow for George Novak , secretary of the Civil
Rights Defense Committee. In a letter to the Times he
pointed out that "the declaration directly conflicts with
the prosecution initiated in Minneapolis. "Prosecutions
speak louder than promises," he noted. (New York
Times, 28 September 1941)
How then does one square Biddle's skepticism about
sedition trials with his authorization of the action against
the Minneapolis Trotskyites? Biddle himself may have
given the answer some eleven years later. Writing in In
Brief Authority he says that he may have been motivated
by the instinct to display firmness on appropriate occasions. He believed that under the circumstances the
case would be fairly tried and would not result in a spate
of prosecutions for sedition as happened in the 1920s. He
thought that the provisions might be declared unconstitutional; and thus he authorized a prosecution so that the
law would be tested at that threshold and taken to the
Supreme Court where it would, he hoped and believed,
be knocked out. Biddle claimed that he sent Henry
Schweinhaut, formerly in charge of the Civil Liberties
Unit of the Department of Justice, to Minneapolis to see
that the U.S. Attorney "did not let his patriotism run
away from him" and to say quietly to the trial judge that
Biddle was anxious that the trial be as narrow as possible.
Biddle felt that the trial itself was fair and took some
solace in the fact that there were a number of acquittals and that the sentences were comparatively light. In
retrospect, he said that he regretted authorizing the prosecutions,
"I should not have tried to test the criminal provisions of the statute in this particular case. The two
Dunne brothers and their twenty-seven associates
were the leaders of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers
Party, a little splinter group, which claimed 3,000
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members , and by no conceivable stretch of a liberal
imagination could have been said to constitute any
'clear and present danger" to our government, which
it was alleged, they were conspiring to overthrow.
There had been no substantial overt act outside of
talk and threats, openly expressed in the time-honored Marxist lingo." (Biddle 1962: 152)

The refusal of the Supreme Court to review the case
was a surprise to Biddle and he felt that the victory for
the government became for him a personal defeat. He
felt that the Court may have thought that the case did
not present strong enough facts on which to test the law.
A draft on the Minneapolis Trotskyite trial, including
this information on Biddle, was sent in November, 1964
to Milton Cantor, associate editor of Labor History. A
month later Mr. Cantor wrote that he and his editorial
board would like to publish the material. However, he
suggested that I contact Mr. Biddle in an attempt to
clear up some of the questions about his role in the proceedings. I wrote to Biddle and enclosed a copy of the
draft in the hope that he would thus be able to answer
for Mr. Cantor and myself the questions the paper rose
about his role in the proceedings. His stinging reply
came a few days later,
"I have just received your letter of December 15th.
There is no basis for your statement that my role in
the Dunne tri al was 'quite enigmatic.' I was opposed
to the sedition and other provisions of the Smith
Act , and doubted their constitutionality. From this
point of view it seemed to me wise to test them
promptly. I therefore authorized the indictment.
The case was tried fairly, and the sentences were
moderate. The Circuit Court sustained the convictions, and the Supreme Court refused to review,
and a few years later held the act constitutional.
What is there 'enigmatic' about my role? Are you
of the opinion that I should have refused to authorize
prosecution because I was opposed to sedition laws
in general, and to this law in particular? Are these
the questions that trouble you and Mr. Cantor?
On page 17 of your article you say: 'While
awaiting sentence Goldman still insisted that it
remained a fact that the conspirators were Dan
Tobin, President Roosevelt, and Attorney General
Biddle, who had invented this frame-up for the purpose of violating the will of the truckdrivers . . .
This language would seem to indicate that you believe there was such a conspirarcy, and you rely on
the opinion of one of the convicted defendants
to prove it. Such a conclusion is of course absurd.
President Roosevelt never communicated with me
about the case directly or indirectly, nor did Dan
Tobin or any other labor representative.
I suggest that in view of what I have said
that you withdraw any suggestion that there was any
'conspiracy' or 'frame-up' in connection with the
prosecution of this case, by any branch of government, or any individual connected with the government." (Letter to author, 28 Dec. 1964)

Mr. Biddle also wrote Mr. Cantor and closed with
the comment, "I suggest that you consult your lawyer as
to whether such a charge - conspiracy - is libelous before you print the article." My first thought was to call
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my friend Frank Farrell, President of the Minnesota
ACLU, and ask him to defend me against libel charges
brought by the former President of the Americans for
Democratic Action. The irony of that situation is quite
evident!
Mr. Cantor reacted negatively to the inference of possible litigation and said that he had no intention of reneging on his promise to publish. He suggested, however,
that speculation about Mr. Biddle's motivation should
be eliminated - unless it could be established that he was
part of a conspiracy,
. .. As it now stands, the evidence suggesting collusion is inadequate. Biddle is quite right in this
regard . The fact that the SWP made the claim can
hardly be taken at face value without substantial
evidence from other sources . . .
Biddle's letter, to be sure, is fascinating - for he
was wounded and obviously feeis some guilt. And
when he says, "Are you of the opinion that I should
have refused to authorize prosecution because I was
opposed to sedition laws in general and to this law
in particular?", the answer is clearly "Yes.'' But
he must be given his due regarding the collusion
charge - in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
And I am returning the enclosed to you in the hope
that the above and my comments of January 18th
will be seriously considered by you and result in
some further revisions along the lines suggested ...
(Letter to author, 22 February 1965)

Revisions were made qualifying the original, although
unintended, abrasive and polemical tone of the paper.
This was done without destroying the study of the behavior of public officials during time of pressure. Thus
it was shown again that, during time of threat, internal
or external, our democratic society permits our government officials, in the name of survival, to limit those
freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. What is shocking here is that an avowed liberal, such as Francis Biddle,
dedicated to preserving these rights, authorized prosecution even though he was opposed to sedition laws in general and to the Smith Act in particular. I close with a
question. If we cannot depend on a man with Biddle's
convictions in a circumstance such as this, where can
we turn?
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Findings on Disarmament
WILLIAM 0. PETERFI
University of Minnesota, Morris
ABSTRACT - The author proposes a critical appraisal of current disarmament plans and their implications in present international affairs, especially, the 1964 draft treaties of the United States
and the Soviet Union calling for a general and complete disarmament. By comparing and evaluating these two plans, the author hopes to prove his thesis that although disarmament is part of
the overall peace effort, the attainment of disarmament will not necessarily establish peace. On
the contrary, before any actual and feasible disarmament can be achieved, there must be established a peaceful international climate conducive to a general and complete disarmament.

Part One

"To disarm or not to disarm," is the question that
might rightfully be asked by a latter day political scientist-, military expert-, statesman-, or just common manturned Hamlet. Of course, the original question posed by
the first Hamlet, "To be or not to be," is as relevant today as it was in the Shakespearean drama. Moreover, to
many people the two questions comprise the real issue
regarding the future of mankind: "If you do not disarm
you simply will not be." Others would develop this idea
to its logical conclusion by saying that mankind will not
survive unless peace is established throughout the world
and to establish peace the nations must disarm. Thus, the
argument goes, disarmament is an absolute prerequisite
to peace; there can be no peace without disarmament.
Whether or not this line of thinking is correct is discussed
in this paper.1
The scope of disarmament can be divided into two disThe author holds the Doctor of Law and Political Science
Degrees from Budapest University, 1950. Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in International Politics, Yale University, I 958-59.
Visiting Scholar in Politics, U.C.L.A., 1959-60. Visi ting Fellowin Politic.s, Princeton University, 1960-61. Between 1961-1965,
he held teaching assignments at various colleges; since September
1965, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University
of Minnesota, Morris; he is currently working on a book, entitled,
Peace Without Disarmament.
1
Because of the very extensive literature on di sarmament, no
attempt is made here to present even a limited bibliography.
However, the present paper reflects, among others, the contributions of the following writers : Raymond Aron , Neville Brown,
Richard A . Falk, Stanley Hoffman, Saul H. Mendlowitz, and
Walter Millis (on war and war prevention); David Frisch, Arthur Hadley, Morton H . Halperin, Louis Henkin, Thomas C .
Schelling (on various aspects of Disarmament); and John W.
Burton, Grenville Clark, Amitai Etzioni, and Louis B. Sohn ( on
the prospects of peace).
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tin ct categories: first, general and complete or comprehensive disarmament; and second, limited arms reduction
or control. The first category would include disarmament
agreements involving all nations and all types of armaments; nations would be permitted only very limited arms
for the maintenance of internal order by internal security
forces. The other form of disarmament, limited in its
scope, would consist of attempts at local agreements between two or more nations and would include only partial armaments limitations.
In a general and complete disarmament plan, which
would be accomplished in various stages leading from
less to more drastic and radical measures, all nations
would adhere to a single treaty. General and complete
disarmament is based on the assumption that there is an
arms race which is general in its scope 2 among the present international community of major and lesser nations.
Thus, since nations do not live in isolation, a military
build-up in one country stimulates similar measures
among its neighbors, and even the neutra1 nations have
no choice but constantly to improve their military posture, and, as a consequence, to be drawn involuntarily
into the arms race. Since the neutral nations are not
members of military alliances, national self-interest and
survival is an individual concern . Most of the present
neutral nations have forces well beyond the level sufficient for the maintenance of internal peace and security.
It follows from this argument, therefore, that any disarmament argreement to which only a few states acceed, such
0
Ao excellent introduction to the study of disarmament and
arms control by Bull ( 1965), establishes a general terminology
of the various meanings of disarmament and arms control, and
offers a theoretical analysis of the subject matter. For practical
purposes, Professor Bull's terminology is used in the present pa~
per.
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